[ox-en] Material peer production (Part 3: Commons and Possession)
- From: Christian Siefkes <christian siefkes.net>
- Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2008 17:43:41 +0100
Hi list,
this is the next-to-last part of my series, completing the description of my
model.
Peer production is based on _commons_ and _possession,_ not on _property._
As long as you _use_ something (by yourself), there is no obvious
difference between possession and property. The difference only becomes
visible when you stop using it: your property still remains your property,
allowing you to _sell_ it to someone else (in return for money or some
other equivalent). But possession is bound to usage--if you no longer need
something, you cease possessing it and somebody else can start possessing
it.
One issue where this becomes relevant is the question of _long-term vs.
short-term usage._ When projects expect people to make contributions in
order to get the things they want, there are cases where the length of
usage should be taken into account. Otherwise, people who want to use
something for a limited period of time would be put at a serious
disadvantage, since they would have to contribute just as much as if they
wanted to use it "forever." When the expected "lifespan" of a good exceeds
the expected time of usage by any given person, it might thus be
appropriate to tie the required contributions to the length of usage,
sharing the overall effort between all who use it over time. For example, a
project or local association organizing housing for its members might
prefer to require contributions for living in a house or apartment for a
certain amount of time (instead of for living there forever), thus
spreading the effort necessary for building and maintaining houses among
all the people who live there over time.
The difference between property and possession is also relevant for the
problem of _resource allocation._ In an economy where everything is based
on commons and possession instead of property, it would not make sense to
treat natural resources as property--to rely on buying and selling to
allocate them. In fact, it would not even be possible: if nothing apart
from resources is sold, how should those who lack them be able to buy them?
The alternative is to treat resources like everything else: as commons and
possession. Since specific resources are typically bound to the location
where they occur, they might be _managed_ by the _local associations_ (cf.
previous part) they are in, but they won't be _owned_ by anybody. Instead,
they are _commons_ when they are not used; they become the _possession_ of
some person or project using them for some purpose; and they revert to the
_commons_ when they are no longer used (provided they haven't been used
up).
Since resources are commons, and since any local association is unlikely to
have enough of _all_ the resources its members need, it makes sense for the
various local associations to _pool_ their resources. They can do so by
using the shared allocation system of an existing _distribution pool_ (cf.
previous part) to distribute the available resources of all participating
local associations among all their inhabitants.
When resources are pooled, they can be allocated to those who want them in
a similar way to other goods distributed through a d-pool. When there is
enough of a resource available for all who want to use it, everybody can
get what they want for free, which is essentially a _flat rate_ model. If
there is more demand than can be satisfied, resources can be "auctioned
off" in the same way as products: the resource will be assigned to the
people or projects willing to contribute most weighted labor to the d-pool
in order to get it _(preference weighting)._ If a project acquires
resources that are not available for free (flat rate), it can add the
weighted labor necessary to get them to the tasks the project members need
to handle, so this additional labor will be distributed among them in the
usual way.
Remember that resources are considered as _commons,_ not as the property of
the local associations where they occur. They are just made available as
additional goods to be distributed through a d-pool. If a resource is
auctioned off at a high cost, the association of origin won't benefit in
any special way; instead, all the other goods distributed through the same
pool will become slightly cheaper. This follows from the fact that
resources are treated just like other goods that are distributed through a
d-pool: if a project successfully distributes one of its products through
the pool, the _effort_ (in weighted labor) required to produce it will be
recognized as a contribution to the pool. But natural resources are not
produced, they just exist, so the production effort to be recognized is
zero.
A concluding part will follow.
Best regards
Christian
--
|-------- Dr. Christian Siefkes --------- christian siefkes.net ---------
| Homepage: http://www.siefkes.net/ | Blog: http://www.keimform.de/
| Peer Production in the Physical World: http://www.peerconomy.org/
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