Message 05238 [Homepage] [Navigation]
Thread: oxenT04643 Message: 109/166 L23 [In index]
[First in Thread] [Last in Thread] [Date Next] [Date Prev]
[Next in Thread] [Prev in Thread] [Next Thread] [Prev Thread]

Re: [ox-en] Epistemological status of the five step model

Hi there,

Mon, 26 Jan 2009 16:51:15 [PHONE NUMBER REMOVED] (MET) Stefan Meretz wrote:

On 2009-01-06 10:21, Raoul wrote:

The definition of the status of “dominant” for a mode of production
is often misunderstood. It is assimilated to a simple question of
share of people producing according to the principles of that mode.
For example, if the share is superior to a given percentage, the mode
would be dominant. In the Marxist conception, a mode of production
can be dominant without involving the majority of the producers. It
is a question of dynamic. Marx considers that capitalism becomes
dominant as early as the 16-17th century, since the further
development of society is already essentially determined by the
still-young capitalist reality.

Exactly. There are really interesting investigations about the huge "dominance shift" we had in europe around 1620. Eske Bockelmann wrote a book ("Im Takt des Geldes" -- roughly: "In the beat of money") about this qualitative historical transistion. He took two examples -- music (and poetry) and science -- and showed, that the understanding and feeling, of what music (or science) is, changed dramatically. In case of music there was a shift from a kind of a "material beat experience" (every beat within a part of music has a distinct meaning) to an "abstract beat experience" (the beat was abstractified through decoupling from the meaning: the modern understanding of abstract "beats" was born). The same applies to poetry and the understanding of science.

thanks for that

i came across a paper, which may be of relevance, and have pasted a bit of it below ...


 The New Reality: The Early Modern Reaction to the Modern Evolution

 Human nature, like the nature of society, can only exist when it
 relates to itself while relating to others, and when it relates to
 others while relating to itself; in short, when the foreign relation
 and the self-relation are recursively closed. This recursiveness
 unfolds itself historically in the synchronization of extensive
 and intensive socialization.[29] The synchronization process can be
 described in roughly schematic fashion as follows.[30]

   In the process of extensive socialization, of the summing-up and
 integration of social structures, the participating individuals and
 human groups must learn to de-center themselves and to harmonize their
 behavior patterns with those of others. This requires the cultivation
 and universalization of such standards of behavior as make possible
 cooperation between members of an expanding social community. This is
 the civilization of human thought and behavior.

   In the process of intensive socialization, of the differentiation
 and specialization of social structures, the participants must learn
 to centralize themselves and to form a cultural identity. This
 requires pluralizing and diversifying forms of life in order to
 express [Ausprägen] those specific collective and personal behavior
 patterns through which human groups and individuals unmistakably
 distinguish themselves from one another. This is the cultivation of
 human thought and behavior.

   The era of modern capitalism, frequently characterized by the
 methods of Ford (i.e., by the forced division of labor and function
 to the extreme limit, the consequent resulting increase of
 productivity, and the accompanying possibility of supplementing
 individual wages and social services with a portion of that increased
 productivity), does not distinguish itself in such a way that the
 synchronization of extensive and intensive socialization, of
 civilization and cultivation, is realized so that humans are removed
 from traditional social milieus and class, as well as from any
 group-specific model for the manner of living. At the same time, and
 of equal importance, this synchronization is not realized such as to
 link humans to two distinct social networks: those administered by
 market formation and power formation.

   It seemed for a while as if this perpetual motion machine had found
 a quick fix for social conflict. The “Fordist” process of
 socialization certainly turned out ambivalent. To the liberation from
 those handed down social edifices visible at a glance, within which a
 good part of individual reproduction was previously completed,
 corresponded an increasing entanglement in the finely spun thread of
 those opaque foreign forces; a market economy and power politics.
 Still, both networks seemed to be stably balanced in their reciprocal
 support. Certainly local turbulence arose around such turning points
 as unskilled labor/sufficient pay; mass production/mass consumption;
 threats to existence/state welfare; growing freedom/the encroachment
 of the culture industry. Certainly the forces and frictions frequently
 distributed themselves in such a way that the system as a whole did
 not turn out to be equally balanced. Yet firmly anchored in both
 networks, little room remained for the exercise or the development of
 individual and collective energies potentially volatile to the market
 and/or power structures.

   That discourse, grouped around such key concepts as a “social market
 economy,” a “social constitutional state,” and “the movement of 68,”
 indicated that in Western Europe after the Second World War
 simultaneous processes set in which forced the evolution of modern
 societies away from the status quo. The modern evolution of society,
 and the behavioral orientation which grows from it, are executed
 within the following three main levels:[31]

 1. The economic level, dominated by the profit orientation of the
    economic subject.

 2. The political level, dominated by the hegemony orientation of
    the political subject.

 3. The cultural level, dominated by the argumentative orientation
    [Argumentationsorientierung] of the cultural subject.

   “Dominant” means here neither “exclusive” nor “immediate.” Other,
 even directly contradictory, behavioral orientations within these
 modes are not only theoretically thinkable, but even practically
 necessary and empirically determinable. “Dominant” in this context is
 to be understood in the sense of a criterion of selection which
 prioritizes [präferiert] from among the variegated multitude of
 established behavioral orientations those which best correspond to the
 given actual orientation and which can most effectively realise it.
 This dominant behavioral orientation acts as a sort of “departure
 point.” Neither the mode to which the immediately determined empirical
 pattern of behavior belongs, nor the mode which primarily structures
 it, is self-evident. On the contrary, advertisements and elections
 furnish ample examples of the multiplicity of subtle processes of
 misrepresentation. For example, the formation of a model that serves
 the behavior orientation of hegemony does not necessarily need to
 explicitly thematize hegemony. It can even directly rebuff hegemony
 and be successful precisely in this way.

   Without a doubt the question of if, when, and to what extent which
 of these three levels, with respect to those modes of the actual
 and/or tendential directing of behavior, is dominant at any given
 micro, meso, and macro level, is debatable. It should however not be
 debatable that the modern evolution of society cannot be reduced to
 the trivial notion that the steering of behavior oriented to profit
 is the all-dominating form that has colonized all other forms of
 behavioral direction, whether based on hegemony or argumentative
 orientations, and that has thoroughly structured, to the last detail,
 worldly, intricacies [Verästelung]. Beyond this, the central problem
 to be practically solved is a “better method and manner for
 cultivating and integrating modern economic, political and cultural
 evolution.” [32]


 29. Compare W. Engler, Teilnehmen und Beobachten. Zur Kritik der
     Wissenssoziologie Dissertation Bern Institut für Theorie,
     Geschichte und Organisation der Wissenschaft der Akademie der
     Wissenschafter der DDR, Berlin, 1988), p. 322 ff.

 30. Compare W. Engler, “Auf dem Weg zu einer Gesellschaft der
     Individuen? Kollektive Handlungschancen jenseits und gegenüber von
     Vermarktung und Vermachtung” (Unpublished manuscript, Berlin,
     February 1990).

 31. Compare H.-P. Krüger, “Zur Differenz zwischen kapitalistischer und
     moderner Gesellschaft.”

 32. Ibid, p. 213.


 Taken from : Illusions and Visions: Models of and in Modern Societies
              by Lutz Marz, Translated by Jed Donelan , or

-- adam

Contact: projekt

Thread: oxenT04643 Message: 109/166 L23 [In index]
Message 05238 [Homepage] [Navigation]